This study examines the redistributional effects of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) using a national database of premium, coverage, and claim payments at the county level between 1980 and 2006. Measuring progressivity as the departure from per capita county income proportionality, we find that NFIP premiums are typically proportional if the time horizon is extended beyond a single year, while claim payments are moderately progressive over all time horizons studied. The net effect of the NFIP program, defined as indemnity payments net of premiums, indicates that NFIP is proportional or at most mildly progressive, while the effect is modest. In sum, we find no evidence that the NFIP disproportionally advantages richer counties.
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Introduction
Damage from flood events is not covered by homeowners insurance policies and flood insurance is not widely available on the private market. Flood coverage is offered federally, however, through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), established by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968. Under current provisions, if communities choose to adopt minimum floodplain management policies, their residents become eligible for this insurance backed by the federal government. The goal of the NFIP is to contain the rising costs of flood events and to provide economically feasible relief to victims to help fuel recovery (Pasterick 1998 ). The NFIP is currently managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security. As of June, 2011, there were just over 5.5 million policies-in-force nationwide.
The NFIP has been the subject of renewed interest in recent years. Unprecedented losses associated with Hurricane Katrina and the other storms of the 2005 hurricane season sent the program deeply into debt, drawing the attention of people living in floodplains, insurance companies, and lawmakers. The NFIP was not designed to cover catastrophic loss years and its current debt to the U.S. Treasury from the 2005 claims-almost $19 billion-has raised concerns about the program's long-term financial solvency.
1 The NFIP will be unable to repay its debt given the current structure of premiums. Should Congress forgive it, taxpayers will bear the costs of returning the NFIP to solvency. In addition to debating debt forgiveness, lawmakers are also considering a wide range of other reforms to the program to address both financial soundness and concerns about who is and who should bear the burden of flood and hurricane costs. suggested that the program is a form of assistance for the poor who could not afford to purchase flood insurance at private market rates. There are concerns that the flood insurance reforms enhancing the program's actuarial soundness could have unintended impacts on home ownership, including property values and the cost of mortgage credit (King 2006) . In this study we provide, as far as we are aware, the first empirical evidence on the overall redistributional effects of the NFIP.
Our analysis of the redistributive effects of the NFIP is based on a unique national database of the total dollars of premium, coverage, and claims paid per county per year from 1980 to 2006. We measure progressivity as the departure of total county premiums and program payouts from per capita county income proportionality. We find that NFIP premiums are typically proportional as the time horizon is extended beyond a single year, while claim payments are moderately progressive over all time horizons studied. The combined or net effect of the NFIP program, defined as indemnity payments minus premiums, shows that the NFIP is proportional or at most mildly progressive while the effect is modest. In sum, we find no evidence that the NFIP disproportionally advantages richer counties.
The next section of the paper offers background on the NFIP relevant to understanding its redistributional effects. Section three discusses our data while the fourth section presents our methods. The fifth section summarizes the results, and the sixth section concludes with a discussion of our findings and some important caveats to our conclusions.
Background on the NFIP
The NFIP was created in 1968 out of a concern that private companies were not willing or able to cover flood risk due to the catastrophic nature of losses, spatial correlation, and adverse selection. It was thought a government program could overcome these challenges. The NFIP was designed as a partnership between the federal government and local communities.
FEMA maps the flood hazard in participating communities on Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs). Participating local governments then adopt baseline regulations in high-hazard areas and, in exchange, the federal government provides insurance to homeowners and businesses.
Homeowners can purchase up to $250,000 of building coverage and up to $100,000 of contents coverage. Business-owners can purchase up to $500,000 each of both building and contents coverage.
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Concerns about the costs of flooding and low take-up rates led Congress in 1973 to make the purchase of flood insurance mandatory for property-owners in 100-year floodplains with a mortgage from a federally backed lender. Take-up rates remained low in the early years of the program, but they have grown steadily over the decades. Still, following major flood events, concern is often expressed that many at-risk homeowners remain without coverage. An estimate of take-up rates in 100-year floodplains by RAND Corporation found high regional variation, with the South and West having the highest take-up rates of around 60 percent, while in the Midwest, take-up rates are only around 20-30 percent (Dixon et al. 2006 ). The NFIP is also highly concentrated geographically, with 40 percent of all policies-in-force nationwide located in Florida and close to 70 percent of all policies located in just five states: Florida, Texas, Louisiana, California, and New Jersey (Michel-Kerjan and Kousky 2010).
There are two types of policies in the NFIP: actuarial policies and discounted policies.
For both types of policies, rates for flood insurance vary by the flood zone indicated on the FIRM and structural characteristics of the property. Currently 78 percent of all policies-in-force are what FEMA calls -actuarial,‖ meaning they are priced using hydrologic models that include catastrophic loss year scenarios. 4 The remaining 22 percent of policies are discounted. These are sometimes referred to as subsidized policies, but it is important to note that these are not subsidized by the general taxpayer. Rather, the discounted policies prevent the program from developing a catastrophe reserve. In 1981 it was decided that the combined revenue from the actuarial and the discounted policies should be enough to cover losses from the -average historical loss year.‖ After a series of rate increases on the discounted policies, this was achieved in 1986. Due to the discounted policies, therefore, the program does not build up a capital reserve to cover high loss years, such as 2005. If Congress forgives the debt incurred from the 2005 season, however, the general taxpayer will be subsidizing these policyholders.
The largest portion of the discounted policies is referred to as -pre-FIRM.‖ These structures were built before the FIRM for a community was available and were offered at discounted rates to encourage communities to join the program, to have homeowners cover at least some of the costs of flood losses (on the supposition that full rates would be so high that individuals would not insure and thus require more disaster aid), and to prevent the abandonment of otherwise economically viable structures through high premiums (Hayes and Neal 2009 This neglects the fact that these areas also pay more in premiums. Indeed, an accurately priced insurance program should be neither progressive nor regressive. Of course, the concern with the NFIP is that its rates are not risk-based, potentially introducing cross-subsidization into the program.
Distributional consequences could arise from two NFIP pricing policies. First is the discounted rates. 6 In general, discounts for pre-FIRM properties are discounts to older structures.
If this is correlated with income, there would be distributional consequences. We, unfortunately, do not have data on which policies are subsidized and which are not and also do not have data on homeowner income or home value and so cannot comment on whether the subsidies currently built into the NFIP inherently go more to higher-income households. A CBO report found, out of a sample of 10,000 households in the NFIP, subsidized coastal properties tend to be higher do not consider the distributional consequences of doing so, although this is worthy of further study.
In this paper, we are able to look at total premiums and claims at the county level. We can thus analyze at the county level whether the program has been regressive or progressive overall. This offers initial empirical guidance to policymakers on an area of interest to the reform effort that is currently very data scarce. It should also suggest areas of more detailed study on this topic, which is unfortunately limited by the fact that the NFIP does not collect income data for policyholders.
Data
This study utilizes data on total claims paid, the number of policies-in-force, and the total premium intake at the U.S. county level from 1980 to 2006, 7 which allows for a county-level analysis of how claims compare to premiums. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables by states. Total premium intake during the period was about $38 billion while the total claims payments were about $37.4 billion. 8 The top five states in terms of total paid claims  Louisiana, Florida, Texas, Mississippi, and Alabama  represent about 75 percent of the total claim payments for the nation as a whole. Louisiana has the highest claim payments which total $16.5 billion or 44.2 percent of the total claim payments, followed by Florida ($4 billion or 10.8 percent of the total payments) and Texas ($3.5 billion or 9.4 percent of the total payments). This 
The Measurement of NFIP Progressivity
In this study, we adapt the well-established tools of tax progressivity to evaluate the equity implications of the NFIP. Modern tax progressivity theory has at its roots Musgrave and Thin (1948) , who were attempting to quantify an equitable approach to reducing taxes in the early post-war period. More recent developments in measurement of progressivity are wellsummarized by Lambert (2002) . In their most general form, tax progressivity measures are based on the familiar Lorenz curve measure of inequality and its associated concentration curve.
The most commonly used measure of progressivity focuses on the net redistributive effect of a fiscal action such as taxes, transfers, and other government programs. This net redistributive effect, which is often referred to as residual progression, measures the equalizing effect of the fiscal action. A fiscal action that improves upon the underlying income distribution is progressive, while a fiscal action that results in greater inequality is regressive. Alternatively, there are well-established measures of the departure from proportionality, also based on the 7 Lorenz curve. This departure from proportionality, also known as liability progression, measures the share distribution of the policy effect across units with varying pre-policy income. Thus increases in progressivity are associated with enhanced departure from proportionality for prepolicy income distribution.
In the case of taxes, the crucial difference in these classes of measures is that the net redistributive effect is influenced by the magnitude of taxes relative to income (tax height), while departure from proportionality is scale invariant. When the level of tax height varies across time, these two measures can tell very different stories about changes in tax progressivity, but both are valid and offer some insight into changes in tax progressivity. Alternatively, when the tax height are the same the two measures provide identical progressivity rankings. In our case, NFIP premiums are small relative to total county income so we can ignore the -tax height‖ and focus on the departure from proportionality measure of progressivity.
We begin by defining the Lorenz curve and its related concentration curve. Let
be the inverse cumulative distribution function of x, and without loss of Bishop, Chow and Formby (1994) , the Lorenz ordinates of x (for our analysis, x represents pre-NFIP county income) and the concentration ordinates of y (premiums or payments) can be written as follows: Following Kakwani (1976) and Jakobsson (1976) , there is a progressive departure from proportionality of the flood insurance payouts if:
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with one strict inequality prevailing at some . We can evaluate NFIP per capita premiums in a similar manner; however, the sign on equation (3) must be reversed. For NFIP premiums to be progressive, counties must have paid premiums in a smaller proportion than their income.
The final issue to be considered in this section relates to which of the many indices of departure from proportionality (DP) to use to evaluate the flood insurance program. A frequent choice is the index based on the familiar Gini coefficient of inequality and its associated concentration index.
Given a continuous distribution F(x), the covariance definition of the Gini index is
and the associated concentration index for
The departure from proportionality is measured as twice the area between the Lorenz curve for pre-program income (X) and the concentration curve for payouts (PO) and premiums (PR):
Using the definitions in (6a) and (6b) results in a positive sign under progressivity and a negative sign for regressivity. Finally, we note that these measures of progressivity are based on sample data. A finding of  (statistically) equal to zero implies proportionality. Inference tests for DP measures are provided by Bishop et al. (1994; 1998) . 
Results
Flooding is a catastrophic risk by nature. Most years, there will be only minimal damage, and yet some years damages will be extremely high, as the program saw in 2005. With a risk such as this, it is not clear over what time period it is optimal to examine distributional impacts.
9
The years of high claims will have a dominating influence on the analysis. For a flood event that
has an annual probability of 1 in 100 or 1 in 500, a few decades is not enough data to accurately assess whether the prices are matching the risk. It just so happened that Katrina hit many lowincome communities, leading to high payments in these areas. Should next year bring a devastating storm to West Palm Beach, Florida, the impact of claims payments might look much more regressive.
This might suggest that we are unable to accurately examine the distributional impacts of the program without centuries of data, but we do not believe this to be the case for two reasons.
First, there is a distribution of floods-while catastrophic floods occur rarely, smaller-scale flooding occurs much more frequently. The distributional consequences of more frequent, but smaller, flood events is still of policy concern, particularly since this is the most common type of flood event. We can analyze this by looking at progressivity over many years. Here, we look at progressivity in 5 year, 10 year, and a 25 year blocks. 14 Second, while looking at one location over only a short time period would likely not capture the distributional impact of the program, we have data for the entire country. There is some correlation in flood risk around the country due to weather patterns and the spatial distribution of river systems, but having data on the entire country over space compensates for having fewer observations over time.
We begin our analysis of NFIP progressivity by examining the departure from proportionality using Lorenz and concentration curves for two time periods, 1991-1995 (Table   3a ) and for the 1980-2006 (Table 3b) . Column 1 provides the Lorenz ordinates for per capita county income, column 2 provides the concentration ordinates for per capita premiums, and column 3 provides the concentration ordinates for per capita NFIP payments. All three columns are population weighted.
The first column in Table 3a shows that the bottom 10 percent of counties received 6.5 percent of total income over the period 1991-1995. These counties paid 5.8 percent of the premiums and received 6.8 percent of NFIP payments. A progressive departure from proportionality requires that every premium decile be smaller (no larger) than its corresponding income decile. While for the 1 st , 3 rd and 4 th deciles the share of premiums paid is less than the share of county income, the opposite is true for the remaining deciles. We can summarize this finding by noting that the DP index (-0.018) is not significantly different from zero, implying that premiums are proportional to income. In contrast, the concentration ordinates for payments are all larger than the corresponding Lorenz ordinates for income implying that NFIP payments are progressive. The progressivity of NFIP payments is shown in Figure 1 , where the concentration curve of NFIP per capita payments lies everywhere above the Lorenz curve of per capita county income. As noted above, the concentration curve can (and does in this case) lie above the 45 degree line. The findings in Table 3b In all cases (except for 1996-2000) the NFIP premiums are proportional to county income.
To assess the combined or net effect of NFIP program, Table 5 provides the net dollar values of the NFIP program (NFIP payments -NFIP premiums). As noted above, DP progressivity indexes are not defined over negative values. So we report simply the net dollar value by county per capita income decile. Like Table 4 Table 5 ).
Discussion and Caveats
This study offers evidence on the progressivity of the NFIP using county level data from 1980 to 2006. From county level income data we calculate population-weighted per capita income, per capita NFIP premiums, and per capita NFIP payments. Earlier studies have suggested that the benefits of the NFIP -are enjoyed largely by wealthy counties.‖ Our findings indicate that the NFIP premiums are generally proportional while NFIP payments are moderately progressive. This suggests that while NFIP rates are not disproportionally benefitting some income groups, claims tend to be paid in lower income areas. Since rates are a function of the value of the home and there are no income-based discounts in NFIP pricing, it is intuitive that premiums would be proportional. Payments may be slightly progressive because nationallyspeaking, riskier areas tend to be lower income despite discussions of mansions on the Florida coast. Sarmiento and Miller (2006) find evidence that both higher and lower income people live in flood hazard areas, the former because of the aesthetics of waterfront property, and the latter because property in risky locations (without high amenities or costly flood mitigation measures) 11 is cheaper. They also estimate that flood damages are higher to lower income groups, consistent with our findings, as well.
A number of caveats, however, are in order. First, our findings are by no means a complete measure of the redistributional effects of the NFIP as we have no information about the individual income of policyholders. We can thus only make statements about aggregate redistributional effects at the level of the county. Our findings would hold for individuals as well, if the income of those buying insurance was symmetric around the income of the county population. While ours is a useful first-order assessment, the largest redistributional effects in the program are likely between those policyholders paying discounted rates and those paying actuarial rates. Unfortunately, the income of those subsidized homeowners is unavailable. More detailed analysis of the redistributional effects at the individual level is warranted since claims payments are concentrated on a few policies. Around 30 percent of claims payments are made to only about 1 percent of policyholders-these are the so-called repetitive loss properties. FEMA has estimated that around 90 percent of repetitive loss properties were constructed pre-FIRM (King 2005) and thus are also paying subsidized rates for their insurance. 15 Second, we have examined the redistributional effect of the programs premiums and claims, not any infusion of taxpayer dollars. 16 If Congress chooses to forgive the NFIP's debt, this will create a cross-subsidy from the general taxpayer to policyholders in the program that have been paying rates that did not include a catastrophe loading to cover an event like 2005.
Understanding the redistributional effects of this debt forgiveness would require comparing the income of the general taxpayer to policyholders in the program.
If the risks of flooding can be accurately modeled, then an insurance program should not have any redistributional effect. Premiums paid should be proportional to the value of the insured structure and the risk that it faces. The NFIP, however, is a government program and its pricing and policies has been subjected to political pressure. This first-order analysis suggests that this influence has not been directed disproportionally at helping higher income communities, as some critics of the NFIP claim. The slight progressivity we find in payments, however, does suggest that the poor may be more at risk for flood damage, whether this is due to location or less adoption of flood mitigation measures. While economists would argue that insurance prices should be risk-based and any redistribution handled through other channels (and we concur), this analysis does suggest there may be a public role in reducing the vulnerability of lower income households to disaster damages. Finally, it is important to note that this finding of slight progressivity in claims payments is still based on those who purchase insurance. There may be low income households in risky locations who choose to forgo insurance because the funds are 12 needed for necessities. Vouchers to help such households afford insurance may be socially desirable.
Endnotes
1. Although the NFIP is supposed to be funded with premiums collected from policyholders rather than with tax dollars, the program is, by design, not actuarially sound (see section 2
for more details). The program is not structured to build a capital surplus, is likely unable to purchase reinsurance to cover catastrophic losses, cannot reject high-risk applicants, and is subject to statutory limits on rate increases (GAO 2010).
2. The U.S. Congress is discussing options for NFIP reform, including i) a phase out of the program's rate subsidies, ii) an increase in the amount FEMA can raise rates each year, and iii) the encouragement of private insurer and reinsurer participation in the market 4. The GAO, however, recently reported that the data used is in some cases out-of-date or inaccurate and thus might be preventing the program from charging appropriate premiums (GAO 2008).
5. These are payments for insured properties. Congress also appropriated over $60 billion in disaster relief for Hurricane Katrina. Some of this money does go to grants for individuals (who may be uninsured) but the amount is limited to just over $30,000.
6. Rates should not vary by value of the property unless property characteristics that drive rates, such as elevation or whether there is a basement, are correlated with value.
7. The authors would like to thank Tim Scoville and Scott Holladay for the data. During Katrina, flooding was also caused by levee failures.
11. Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S.
Department of Commerce.
12. It is important to note that in the construction of Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients we weight per capita income by population. Thus major urban counties are counted in proportion to their population size.
13. A natural question to ask is why not to combine NFIP premiums and payments into an overall DP index. The answer is that this can result in negative values and the concentration index is not well defined over negative values. We provide some results on overall program progressivity in Table 5 below.
14. The appendix provides the DP indexes for per capita NFIP premiums and payments on an 16. See Wildasin (2008) for a discussion of federal commitments to insure losses from future disasters. 
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